Oracles

Friktion uses Inertia protocol for its European Cash-settled options.
These options use a 30 minute TWAP from of the underlying price as the fixing price for settlement from Pyth and Switchboard Oracles. 
Friktion uses the following criteria to determine valid oracle prices for its TWAP: 
Price != null
Price > 0
Confidence/Price < 0.25 to ensure the confidence is tight enough
Number of valid updates in TWAP period > 30 to ensure freshness.
In case of oracle issues where the number of TWAP updates is less than 30 in the period, then Friktion will use an off-chain calculation for the settlement price. It will take a historical backfill of the settlement period taken from the oracle provider.
If the historical backfill has clearly erroneous data after applying the above filtering, the fixing price will be an off-chain calculation of the 30 minute TWAP taken from exchange capture using the ccxt library. 
Symbol
Oracle Provider
Pubkey
SOL
Pyth
H6ARHf6YXhGYeQfUzQNGk6rDNnLBQKrenN712K4AQJEG
mSOL
Pyth
E4v1BBgoso9s64TQvmyownAVJbhbEPGyzA3qn4n46qj9
BTC
Pyth
GVXRSBjFk6e6J3NbVPXohDJetcTjaeeuykUpbQF8UoMU
AVAX
Pyth
Ax9ujW5B9oqcv59N8m6f1BpTBq2rGeGaBcpKjC5UYsXU
STSOL
Pyth
Bt1hEbY62aMriY1SyQqbeZbm8VmSbQVGBFzSzMuVNWzN
STEP
Switchboard
4bTCjzmtdRgK4ZvdaxX1Fx1Z3h6iApfM5qoaAhQBJAkj
SBR
Pyth
8Td9VML1nHxQK6M8VVyzsHo32D7VBk72jSpa9U861z2A
FTT
Pyth
8JPJJkmDScpcNmBRKGZuPuG2GYAveQgP3t5gFuMymwvF
LUNA
Pyth
5bmWuR1dgP4avtGYMNKLuxumZTVKGgoN2BCMXWDNL9nY
scnSOL
Switchboard
DpzEKDSszosuzRUdRYzEcEbt6iZ4xhVEANQSRAYDYw8h
SRM
Pyth
3NBReDRTLKMQEKiLD5tGcx4kXbTf88b7f2xLS9UuGjym
MNGO
Pyth
79wm3jjcPr6RaNQ4DGvP5KxG1mNd3gEBsg6FsNVFezK4
RAY
Pyth
AnLf8tVYCM816gmBjiy8n53eXKKEDydT5piYjjQDPgTB
ETH
Pyth
JBu1AL4obBcCMqKBBxhpWCNUt136ijcuMZLFvTP7iWdB
More information on the Pyth client can be found here:
Pyth Network
GitHub
Frontrunning & Flashloans Prevention
It is highly unlikely an entity would be able to front-run the oracles used in Friktion. This is because they use centralized exchange liquidity as input, and volt capacities are carefully managed to prevent total deposits from exceeding volume observed across all liquidity platforms. Additionally, the Friktion team is always adapting our auction process to avoid predictability and specifically prevent exposure to these sorts of attacks. Read more about our mitigation efforts here.
Additionally, it is impossible for an adversary to apply flashloans as an attack against Friktion. Volt #1 and #2 are not based on any decentralized oracles or markets that could be included in a flash loans transaction. With the delayed epoch mechanism for processing pending deposits/withdrawals, sudden fluctuations in the price of the deposit token on-chain (or even in the oracle based on CEXes) wouldn't change program state in any fashion. Regarding Volt #3 & #4, the oracles used to mark the value of the margin positions are entirely based on centralized exchange prices (SOL & BTC from Pyth), so a flash loan would be ineffectual.

Friktion Protocol - Previous

Programs

Code to read Oracle Price

Last modified 13d ago

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Frontrunning & Flashloans Prevention